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From Practice to Theory, or What is a White
Woman Anyway?
Catharine A. MacKinnon t
And ain't I a woman?
Sojourner Truth'
Black feminists speak as women because we are women ....
Audre Lorde2
It is common to say that something is good in theory but not in practice.
I always want to say, then it is not such a good theory, is it? To be good in
theory but not in practice posits a relation between theory and practice that
places theory prior to practice, both methodologically and normatively, as if
theory is a terrain unto itself. The conventional image of the relation between
the two is first theory, then practice. You have an idea, then act on it. In legal
academia you theorize, then try to get some practitioner to put it into practice.
To be more exact, you 'read law review articles, then write more law review
articles. The closest most legal academics come to practice is teaching-their
students, most of whom will practice, being regarded by many as an
occupational hazard to their theorizing.
The postmodern version of the relation between theory and practice is
discourse unto death. Theory begets no practice, only more text. It proceeds
as if you can deconstruct power relations by shifting their markers around in
your head. Like all formal idealism, this approach to theory tends
unselfconsciously to reproduce existing relations of dominance, in part because
it is an utterly removed elite activity. On this level, all theory is a form of
practice, because it either subverts or shores up existing deployments of power,
in their martial metaphor. As an approach to change, it is the same as the
conventional approach to the theory/practice relation: head-driven, not
world-driven. Social change is first thought about, then acted out. Books relate
to books, heads talk to heads. Bodies do not crunch bodies or people move
t Catharine A. MacKinnon is Professor of Law at the University of Michigan Law School. This paper
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1. BLACK WOMEN IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICAN LIFE: THEIR WORDS, THEIR THOUGHTS,
THEIR FEELINGS 235 (Bert J. Loewenberg & Ruth Bogin eds., 1976).
2. AUDRE LORDE, SISTER OUTSIDER 60 (1984). The whole quotation is "Black feminists speak as
women because we are women and do not need others to speak for us."
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people. As theory, it is the de-realization of the world.
The movement for the liberation of women, including in law, moves the
other way around. It is first practice, then theory. Actually, it moves this way
in practice, not just in theory. Feminism was a practice long before it was a
theory. On its real level, the women's movement-where women move against
their determinants as women-remains more practice than theory. This
distinguishes it from academic feminism. For women in the world, the gap
between theory and practice is the gap between practice and theory. We know
things with our lives, and live that knowledge, beyond anything any theory has
yet theorized. Women's practice of confrontation with the realities of male
dominance outruns any existing theory of the possibility of consciousness or
resistance. To write the theory of this practice is not to work through logical
puzzles or entertaining conundra, not to fantasize utopias, not to moralize or
tell people what to do. It is not to exercise authority; it does not lead practice.
Its task is to engage life through developing mechanisms that identify and
criticize rather than reproduce social practices of subordination and to make
tools of women's consciousness and resistance that further a practical struggle
to end inequality. This kind of theory requires humility and it requires
participation.
I am saying: we who work with law need to be about the business of
articulating the theory of women's practice-women's resistance, visions,
consciousness, injuries, notions of community, experience of inequality. By
practical, I mean socially lived. As our theoretical question becomes "what
is the theory of women's practice," our theory becomes a way of moving
against and through the world, and methodology becomes technology.
Specifically-and such theory inhabits particularity-I want to take up the
notion of experience "as a woman" and argue that it is the practice of which
the concept of discrimination "based on sex" is the legal theory. That is, I
want to investigate how the realities of women's experience of sex inequality
in the world have shaped some contours of sex discrimination in the law.
Sex equality as a legal concept has not traditionally been theorized to
encompass issues of sexual assault or reproduction because equality theory has
been written out of men's practice, not women's. Men's experiences of
group-based subordination have not centered on sexual and reproductive abuse,
although they include instances of it. Some men have been hurt in these ways,
but they are few and are not usually regarded as hurt because they are men,
but in spite of it or in derogation of it. Few men are, sexually and
reproductively speaking, "similarly situated" to women but treated better. So
sexuality and reproduction are not regarded as equality issues in the traditional
approach.3 Two intrepid, indomitable women, women determined to write the
practice of their lives onto the law, moved the theory of sex equality to include
3. I detail this argument further in Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281
(1991).
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these issues.
In her case, Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,4 Mechelle Vinson established
that sexual harassment as a working environment is sex discrimination under
civil rights law. Her resistance to her supervisor Sidney Taylor-specifically,
her identification that his repeated rape, his standing over her in the bank vault
waving his penis and laughing, were done to her because she was a
woman-changed the theory of sex discrimination for all women. In her case,
California Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Guerra,5 Lillian Garland
established that -guaranteeing unpaid leaves for pregnant women by law is not
discrimination on the basis of sex, but is a step in ending discrimination on
the basis of sex. Her resistance to her employer, the California Federal Savings
and Loan Association, in its refusal to reinstate her in her job after a
pregnancy leave; her identification of that practice as illegal treatment of her
because she was a woman, gave sex equality law a decisive spin in the
direction of promoting equality, away from its prior status quo-mirroring
regressive neutrality. The arguments that won these cases were based on the
plaintiffs' lives as women, on insisting that actual social practices that
subordinated them as women be theoretically recognized as impermissible
sex-based discrimination under law. In the process, sexual assault and
reproduction became sex equality issues, with implications for the laws of rape
and abortion, among others.
So what is meant by treatment "as women" here? To speak of being treated
"as a woman" is to make an empirical statement about reality, to describe the
realities of women's situation. In this country, with parallels in other cultures,
women's situation combines unequal pay with allocation to disrespected work,
sexual targeting for rape, domestic battering, sexual abuse as children, and
systematic sexual harassment; depersonalization, demeaned physical
characteristics, use in denigrating entertainment, deprivation of reproductive
control, and forced prostitution. To see that these practices are done by men
to women is to see these abuses as forming a system, a hierarchy of inequality.
This situation has occurred in many places, in one form or another, for a very
long time, often in a context characterized by disenfranchisement, preclusion
from property ownership (women are more likely to be property than to own
any), ownership and use as object, exclusion from public life, sex-based
poverty, degraded sexuality, and a devaluation of women's human worth and
contributions throughout society. This subordination of women to men is
socially institutionalized, cumulatively and systematically shaping access to
human dignity, respect, resources, physical security, credibility, membership
in community, speech, and power. Comprised of all its variations, the group
women can be seen to have a collective social history of disempowerment,
exploitation and subordination extending to the present. To be treated "as a
4. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
5. California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra. 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
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woman" in this sense is to be disadvantaged in these ways incident to being
socially assigned to the female sex. To speak of social treatment "as a woman"
is thus not to invoke any abstract essence or homogeneous generic or ideal
type, not to posit anything, far less a universal anything, but to refer to this
diverse and pervasive concrete material reality of social meanings and practices
such that, in the words of Richard Rorty, "a woman is not yet the name of a
way of being human . . . ."6
Thus cohering the theory of "women" out of the practice of "women"
produces the opposite of what Elizabeth Spelmanhas criticized as a reductive
assumption of essential sameness of all women that she identifies in some
feminist theory.7 The task of theorizing women's practice produces a new kind
of theory, a theory that is different from prior modes of theorizing in form,
not just content. As Andrea Dworkin said quite a long time ago, women's
situation requires new ways of thinking, not just thinking new things!
"Woman" as abstraction, distillation, common denominator, or idea is the old
way of thinking, or at most a new thing to think, but it is not a new way of
thinking. Nor is thinking "as" a woman, as one embodiment of a collective
experience, the same as thinking "like" a woman, which is to reproduce one's
determinants and think like a victim.
Some recent work, especially Elizabeth Spelman's, could be read to argue
that there is no such thing as experience "as a woman" and women of color
prove it.9 This theory converges with the elevation of "differences" as a flag
under which to develop diverse feminisms.1 ° To do theory in its conventional
abstract way, as many do, is to import the assumption that all women are the
same or they are not women. What makes them women is their fit within the
abstraction "woman" or their conformity to a fixed, posited female essence.
The consequence is to reproduce dominance. While much work subjected to
this criticism does not do this," t one can trace it, surprisingly, in the works
6. Richard Rorty, Feminism and Pragmatism, 30 MICH. Q. REV. 231, 234 (1991) ("MacKinnon's
central point, as I read her, is that 'a woman' is not yet the name of a way of being human-not yet the
name of a moral identity, but, at most, the name of a disability.").
7. ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXcLUSION IN FEMINIST THOUGHT
158-59 (1988).
8. "[Olne can be excited about ideas without changing at all. [tO]e can think about ideas, talk about
ideas, without changing at all. [Pleople are willing to think about many things. What people refuse to do,
or are not permitted to do, or resist doing, is to change the way they think." ANDREA DWORKIN, WOMAN
HATING 202 (1974).
9. SPELMAN, supra note 7, at 164-166, 174, 186. Spelman defines "essentialism" largely in terms
of central tenets of radical feminism, without being clear whether the experience "as a woman" she
identifies in radical feminism is a social or a biological construct. Having done this, it becomes easy to
conclude that the "woman" of feminism is a distilled projection of the personal lives of a few comparatively
powerful biological females, rather than a congealed synthesis of the lived social situation of women as
a class, historically and worldwide.
10. Spelman implies that "differences" not be valorized or used as a theoretical construct, id. at 174,
but others, building on her work and that of Carol Gilligan, CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE
(1982), do.
11. The philosophical term "essentialism" is sometimes wrongly applied to socially-based theories
that observe and analyze empirical commonalities in women's condition. See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, Race
and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 590-601 (1990). One can also take
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of Simone DeBeauvoir and Susan Brownmiller.
DeBeauvoir, explaining why women are second class citizens, says:
Here we have the key to the whole mystery. On the biological level a
species is maintained only by creating itself anew; but this creation
results only in repeating the same Life in more individuals. . . . Her
[woman's] misfortune is to have been biologically destined for the
repetition of Life, when even in her own view Life does not carry
within itself its reasons for being, reasons that are more important than
Life itself. ' 2
Here women are defined in terms of biological reproductive capacity. It is
unclear exactly how any social organization of equality could change such an
existential fact, far less how to argue that a social policy that institutionalized
it could be sex discriminatory.
Susan Brownmiller argues the centrality of rape in women's condition in
the following terms:
Man's structural capacity to rape and woman's corresponding structural
vulnerability are as basic to the physiology of both our sexes as the
primal act of sex itself. Had it not been for this accident of biology,
an accommodation requiring the locking together of two separate parts,
penis and vagina, there would be neither copulation nor rape as we
know it.... By anatomical fiat-the inescapable construction of their
genital organs-the human male was a natural predator and the human
female served as his natural prey.13
Exactly how to oppose sexual assault from this vantage point is similarly
unclear. Do we make a law against intercourse? Although both theorists have
considerably more to offer on the question of what defines women's condition,
what we have in these passages is simple biological determinism presented as
a critical theory of social change.
The problem here, it seems to me, does not begin with a failure to take
account of race or class, but with the failure to take account of gender. It is
not only or most fundamentally an account of race or class dominance that is
missing here, but an account of male dominance. There is nothing biologically
necessary about rape, as Mechelle Vinson made abundantly clear when she
sued for rape as unequal treatment on the basis of sex. And, as Lillian Garland
saw, and made everyone else see, it is the way society punishes women for
an essentialist approach to race or class. In other words, a theory does not become "essentialist" to the
degree it discusses gender as such nor is it saved from "essentialism" to the degree it incorporates race
or class.
12. SIMONE DEBEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX 64 (H.M. Parshley ed. & trans., 1971).
13. SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN, AND RAPE 4, 6 (1976).
1991]
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
reproduction that creates women's problems with reproduction, not
reproduction itself. Both women are Black. This only supports my suspicion
that if a theory is not true of, and does not work for, women of color, it is not
really true of, and will not work for, any women, and that it is not really about
gender at all. The theory of the practice of Mechelle Vinson and Lillian
Garland, because it is about the experience of Black women, is what gender
is about.
In recent critiques of feminist work for failing to take account of race or
class, 14 it is worth noting that the fact that there is such a thing as race and
class is assumed, although race and class are generally treated as abstractions
to attack gender rather than as concrete realities, if indeed they are treated at
all. Spelman, for example, discusses race but does virtually nothing with
class. 5 In any event, race and class are regarded as unproblematically real
and not in need of justification or theoretical construction. Only gender is not
real and needs to be justified. Although many women have demanded that
discussions of race or class take gender into account, typically demands these
do not take the form that, outside explicit recognition of gender, race or class
do not exist. That there is a diversity to the experience of men and women of
color, and of working class women and men regardless of race, is not said to
mean that race or class are not meaningful concepts. I have heard no one say
that there can be no meaningful discussion of "people of color" without gender
specificity. Thus the phrase "people of color and white women" has come to
replace the previous "women and minorities," which women of color rightly
perceived as not including them twice, and embodying a white standard for
sex and a male standard for race. But I hear no talk of "all women and men
of color," for instance. It is worth thinking about that when women of color
refer to "people who look like me," it is understood that they mean people of
color, not women, in spite of the fact that both race and sex are visual
assignments, both possess clarity as well as ambiguity, and both are marks of
oppression, hence community.
In this connection, it has recently come to my attention that the white
woman is the issue here, so I decided I better find out what one is. This
creature is not poor, not battered, not raped (not really), not molested as a
child, not pregnant as a teenager, not prostituted, not coerced into
pornography, not a welfare mother, and not economically exploited. She
doesn't work. She is either the white man's image of her-effete, pampered,
14. 1 am thinking in particular of SPELMAN, see supra note 7, and Marlee Kline, Race, Racism, and
Feminist Legal Theory, 12 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 115 (1989), although this analysis also applies to others
who have made the same argument, such as Harris, supra note 11. Among its other problems, much of
this work tends to make invisible the women of color who were and are instrumental in defining and
creating feminism as a movement of women in the world, as well as a movement of mind.
15. This is by contrast with the massive feminist literature on the problem of class, which I discuss
and summarize as a foundational problem for feminist theory in TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE
STATE (1989). Harris, supra note 11, discusses race but does nothing with either class or sexual orientation
except invoke them as clubs against others. See, for example, id. at 588, n.26 and accompanying text.
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privileged, protected, flighty, and self-indulgent-or the Black man's image
of her-all that, plus the "pretty white girl" (meaning ugly as sin but regarded
as the ultimate in beauty because she is white). She is Miss Anne of the
kitchen, she puts Frederick Douglass to the lash, she cries rape when Emmett
Till looks at her sideways, she manipulates white men's very real power with
the lifting of her very well-manicured little finger. She makes an appearance
in Baraka's "rape the white girl,"16 as Cleaver's real thing after target
practice on Black women, 7 as Helmut Newton's glossy upscale hard-edged,
distanced, vamp,'8 and as the Central Park Jogger, the classy white madonna
who got herself raped and beaten nearly to death. She flings her hair, feels
beautiful all the time, complains about the colored help, tips badly, can't do
anything, doesn't do anything, doesn't know anything, and alternates
fantasizing about fucking Black men with accusing them of raping her. As
Ntozake Shange points out, all Western civilization depends on her.' 9 On top
of all of this, out of impudence, imitativeness, pique, and a simple lack of
anything meaningful to do, she thinks she needs to be liberated. Her feminist
incarnation is all of the above, and guilty about every single bit of it, having
by dint of repetition refined saying "I'm sorry" to a high form of art. She can't
even make up her own songs.
There is, of course, much to much of this, this "woman, modified," this
woman discounted by white, meaning she would be oppressed but for her
privilege. But this image seldom comes face to face with the rest of her reality:
the fact that the majority of the poor are white women and their children (at
least half of whom are female); that white women are systematically battered
in their homes, murdered by intimates and serial killers alike, molested as
children, actually raped (mostly by white men), and that even Black men, on
average, make more than they do.2" If one did not know this, one could be
taken in by white men's image of white women: that the pedestal is real, rather
than a cage in which to confine and trivialize them and segregate them from
the rest of life, a vehicle for sexualized infantilization, a virginal set-up for
rape by men who enjoy violating the pure, and a myth with which to try to
control Black women. (See, if you would lie down and be quiet and not move,
we would revere you, too.) One would think that the white men's myth that
16. LEROI JONES, Black Dada Nihilismus, in THE DEAD LECTURER 61, 63 (1964).
17. "1 became a rapist. To refine my technique and modus operandi, I started out by practicing on
black girls in the ghetto ... and when I considered myself smooth enough, I crossed the tracks and sought
out white prey." ELDRIDGE CLEAVER, SOUL ON ICE 14 (1968). "[Rlaping the white girl" as an activity
for Black men is described as one of "the funky facts of life," in a racist context in which the white girl's
white-girlness is sexualized-that is, made a site of lust, hatred and hostility-for the Black man through
the history of lynching. Id. at 14-15.
18. HELMUT NEWTON, WHITE WOMEN (1976).
19. NTOZAKE SHANGE, THREE PIECES 48 (1981).
20. In 1989, the median income of white women was approximately one-fourth less than that of Black
men; in 1990 it was one-fifth less. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REP., Ser. P-60,
No. 174, MONEY INCOME OF HOUSEHOLDS, FAMILIES, AND PERSONS IN THE UNITED STATES: 1990 104-05
(tbl. 24) (1991).
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they protect white women was real, rather than a racist cover to guarantee
their exclusive and unimpeded sexual access-meaning they can rape her at
will, and do, a posture made good in the marital rape exclusion and the largely
useless rape law generally. One would think that the only white women in
brothels in the South during the Civil War were in Gone With the Wind.2"
This is not to say there is no such thing as skin privilege, but rather that it has
never insulated white women from the brutality and misogyny of men, mostly
but not exclusively white men, or from its effective legalization. In other
words, the "white girls" of this theory miss quite a lot of the reality of white
women in the practice of male supremacy.
Beneath the trivialization of the white woman's subordination implicit in
the dismissive sneer "straight white economically-privileged women" (a phrase
which has become one word, the accuracy of some of its terms being rarely
documented even in law journals) lies the notion that there is no such thing
as the oppression of women as such. If white women's oppression is an illusion
of privilege and a rip-off and reduction of the civil rights movement, we are
being told that there is no such thing as a woman, that our practice produces
no theory, and that there is no such thing as discrimination on the basis of sex.
What I am saying is, to argue that oppression "as a woman" negates rather
than encompasses recognition of the oppression of women on other bases, is
to say that there is no such thing as the practice of sex inequality.
Let's take this the other way around. As I mentioned, both Mechelle
Vinson and Lillian Garland are African-American women. Wasn't Mechelle
Vinson sexually harassed as a woman? Wasn't Lillian Garland pregnant as a
woman? They thought so. The whole point of their cases was to get their
injuries understood as "based on sex," that is, because they are women. The
perpetrators, and the policies under which they were disadvantaged, saw them
as women. What is being a woman if it does not include being oppressed as
one? When the Reconstruction Amendments "gave Blacks the vote," and Black
women still could not vote, weren't they kept from voting "as women?" When
African-American women are raped two times as often as white women, aren't
they raped as women? That does not mean their race is irrelevant and it does
not mean that their injuries can be understood outside a racial context. Rather,
it means that "sex" is made up of the reality of the experiences of all women,
including theirs. It is a composite unit rather than a divided unitary whole,
such that each woman, in her way, is all women. So, when white women are
sexually harassed or lose their jobs because they are pregnant, aren't they
women too?
The treatment of women in pornography shows this approach in graphic
relief. One way or another, all women are in pornography. African-American
women are featured in bondage, struggling, in cages, as animals, insatiable.
As Andrea Dworkin has shown, the sexualized hostility directed against them
21. This is an insight of Dorothy Teer.
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makes their skin into a sex organ, focusing the aggression and contempt
directed principally at other women's genitals."2 Asian women are passive,
inert, as if dead, tortured unspeakably. Latinas are hot mommas. Fill in the
rest from every demeaning and hostile racial stereotype you know; it is sex
here. This is not done to men, not in heterosexual pornography. What is done
to white women is a kind of floor; it is the best anyone is treated and it runs
from Playboy through sadomasochism to snuff. What is done to white women
can be done to any woman, and then some. This does not make white women
the essence of womanhood. It is a reality to observe that this is what can be
done and is done to the most privileged of women. This is what privilege as
a woman gets you: most valued as dead meat.
I am saying, each woman is in pornography as the embodiment of her
particularities. This is not in tension with being there "as a woman," it is what
being there as a woman means. Her specificity makes up what gender is.
White, for instance, is not a residual category. It is not a standard against
which the rest are "different." There is no generic "woman" in pornography.
White is not unmarked; it is a specific sexual taste. Being defined and used
in this way defines what being a woman means in practice. Robin Morgan
once said, "pornography is the theory, rape is the practice."' This is true,
but Andrea Dworkin's revision is more true: "Pornography is the theory,
pornography is the practice."24 This approach to "what is a woman" is
reminiscent of Sartre's answer to the question "what is a Jew?" Start with the
anti-Semite.'
In my view, the subtext to the critique of oppression "as a woman," the
critique that holds that there is no such thing, is dis-identification with women.
One of its consequences is the destruction of the basis for a jurisprudence of
sex equality. An argument advanced in many critiques by women of color has
been that theories of women must include all women, and when they do,
theory will change. On one level, this is necessarily true. On another, it
ignores the formative contributions of women of color to feminist theory since
its inception. I also sense, though, that many women, not only women of color
and not only academics, do not want to be "just women," not only because
something important is left out, but also because that means being in a category
with "her," the useless white woman whose first reaction when the going gets
rough is to cry. I sense here that people feel more dignity in being part of any
group that includes men than in being part of a group that includes that
22. ANDREA DwORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN 215-16 (1981).
23. ROBIN MORGAN, GOING Too FAR 169 (1978).
24. Personal communication with Andrea Dworkin. See also ANDREA DWORKIN, MERCY 232, 304-07.
(1991).
25. "Thus, to know what the contemporary Jew is, we must ask the Christian conscience. And we
must ask, not 'What is a Jew?' but 'What have you made of the Jews?'
The Jew is one whom other men consider a Jew: that is the simple truth from which we must start.
In this sense ... it is the anti-Semite who makes the Jew." JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, ANTI-SEMITE AND JEW
69 (George J. Becker trans., 1948).
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ultimate reduction of the notion of oppression, that instigator of lynch mobs,
that ludicrous whiner, that equality coat-tails rider, the white woman. It seems
that if your oppression is also done to a man, you are more likely to be
recognized as oppressed, as opposed to inferior. Once a group is seen as
putatively human, a process helped by including men in it, an oppressed man
falls from a human standard.2" A woman is just a woman-the ontological
victim-so not victimized at all.
Unlike other women, the white woman who is not poor or working class
or lesbian or Jewish or disabled or old or young does not share her oppression
with any man. That does not make her condition any more definitive of the
meaning of "women" than the condition of any other woman is. But
trivializing her oppression, because it is not even potentially racist or class-
biased or heterosexist or anti-Semitic, does define the meaning of being
"anti-woman" with a special clarity. How the white woman is imagined and
constructed and treated becomes a particularly sensitive indicator of the degree
to which women, as such, are despised.
If we build a theory out of women's practice, comprised of the diversity
of all women's experiences, we do not have the problem that some feminist
theory has been rightly criticized for. When we have it is when we make
theory out of abstractions and accept the images forced on us by male
dominance. I said all that so I could say this: the assumption that all women
are the same is part of the bedrock of sexism that the women's movement is
predicated on challenging. That some academics find it difficult to theorize
without reproducing it simply means that they continue to do to women what
theory, predicated on the practice of male dominance, has always done to
women. It is their notion of what theory is, and its relation to its world, that
needs to change.
If our theory of what is "based on sex" makes gender out of actual social
practices distinctively directed against women as women identify them, the
problem that the critique of so-called "essentialism" exists to rectify ceases
to exist. And this bridge, the one from practice to theory, is not built on
anyone's back.
26. 1 sense a similar dynamic at work in the attraction among some lesbians of identification with "gay
rights" rather than "women's rights," with the result of obscuring the roots in male dominance of the
oppression of both lesbians and gay men.
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